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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Juries usually do their job very well . . . . But juries also have the 
ability to disappoint us, sometimes to the point of forcing us to 
question whether we should have jury trials at all. One of this 
country’s great observers of human nature, Mark Twain, once 
complained that juries had become “the most ingenious and infal-
lible agency for defeating justice that human wisdom could con-
trive.”1 
 Juries have been widely criticized and widely studied. The popu-
lar view is that juries are pro-plaintiff decisionmaking bodies, easily 
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 1. Sandra Day O’Connor, Juries: They May Be Broke, but We Can Fix Them, 44 FED. 
LAW. 20, 20 (1997). 
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swayed by sympathy, highly likely to find liability, and inclined to 
award high amounts in damages. A wealth of empirical research, 
however, calls those stereotypes into doubt. Reviews of empirical re-
search examining jury decisionmaking, while finding particular ar-
eas in which juries encounter difficulty (for example, understanding 
legal instructions), attest to the overall competence of juries as deci-
sionmakers.2 
 Nonetheless, criticism of the jury system has led to recent calls to 
eliminate or to minimize the role of the jury in deciding legal cases. 
Many of the arguments made against the institution of the jury carry 
with them—either explicitly or implicitly—the suggestion that jury 
decisionmaking ought to be replaced with judicial decisionmaking.3 
As Harry Kalven argued: 
When one asserts that jury adjudication is of low quality, he must 
be asserting that jury decisions vary in some significant degree 
from those a judge would have made in the same cases. If he de-
nies this and wishes to include the judge, he has lost any baseline, 
and with it any force, for his criticism. . . . Further, trial by judge 
is the relevant and obvious alternative to trial by jury. To argue 
against jury trial is, therefore, to argue for bench trial.4 
 In addition to being the most likely alternative mechanism for de-
cisionmaking, judges are also the individuals with whom the jury di-
vides the labor of deciding cases. Cases that go to trial are decided by 
either a judge or a jury and, within jury trials, judges and juries di-
                                                                                                                    
 2. See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986); Edith 
Greene et al., Jurors and Juries: A Review of the Field, in TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 
INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 225 (James R.P. Ogloff ed., 2002); Robert MacCoun, In-
side the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Ju-
ries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Jen-
nifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications 
for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American 
Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998). 
 3. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s 
Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 917 (1998); Paul Mogin, Why 
Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179 (1998); Cass R. 
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in 
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2127 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 
1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 60 (1999); see also Mark Curriden, Putting the Squeeze on Ju-
ries, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 52, 53; William Glaberson, Juries, Their Powers Under Siege, 
Find Their Role Is Being Eroded, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A1; Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, 
A Judge Can Do the Work of 12 Amateurs, and Better, TIMES (London), Oct. 21, 2003, at 10.  
Blom-Cooper argues that: 
The jury is the high point of amateurism, potentially a recipe for incompetence 
and bias. The mood of civilised systems of criminal justice increasingly de-
mands professionalism. I am not contemptuous of the amateur’s ability to 
judge human conduct, only the task of evaluating evidence in the courtroom, 
which is a job for professionals. 
Id. 
 4. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1964). 
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vide the work by assuming different roles. Accordingly, any reform of 
the jury system ought to take into account the degree to which juries 
and judges would make decisions differently.5 
 Proposals to substitute judicial decisionmaking for that of the jury 
or to make other jury reforms, however, have been put forth without 
a clear understanding of the similarities and differences in how ju-
ries and judges decide legal cases. Compared to the extensive study 
of the decisionmaking of jurors and juries, there has been relatively 
little examination of trial judges’ decisionmaking, and even fewer 
studies have directly compared the decisionmaking of juries and 
judges.6 While there are reasonable arguments for why judges and 
juries might differ in how they make legal decisions, these argu-
ments are, in the absence of more research, speculative at best.7 
 The purpose of this Article is to examine what the limited, but 
growing, body of empirical research has revealed about the similari-
ties and differences in juror and judicial decisionmaking. Part II de-
scribes the range of methods available for comparing jurors and 
judges. Part III discusses studies examining the degree to which 
judges agree with decisions made by juries. Part IV examines re-
search that has compared the outcomes of jury trials and bench tri-
als. Part V reviews simulation experiments that have compared the 
decisionmaking processes of judges and jurors in various legal do-
mains. Part VI describes the normative difficulties in focusing on the 
comparison of juries to judges, the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of judicial and jury decisionmaking, and how future research 
might be structured in order to develop a more useful picture of how 
these two types of decisionmakers compare. Part VII concludes. 
                                                                                                                    
 5. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Jury Reform at the End of the Century: Real Agreement, 
Real Changes, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 213, 219 (1999) (“If juries are susceptible to errors 
of reasoning on some aspects of their task, and judges are not, the focus of reform efforts 
should be specifically aimed at the jury; but if judges are susceptible to the same errors as 
jurors, obviously a different kind of reform is needed.”). 
 6. Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror As-
sessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 328 (1999) 
(“Considering the amount of attention that has been given to jurors’ ability to use legal 
evidence, it is remarkable how little we know about their professional counterparts [that 
is, judges].”); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Tran-
scending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1125 (1992) (“One might suppose that, 
with so much at stake for so long, we would all know a lot about the ways juries differ from 
judges in their behavior. In fact, we know remarkably little.”); Ellsworth, supra note 5, at 
218-19 (“[T]here is hardly any research that actually compares judges’ and juries’ re-
sponses to the same trial materials; thus we do not know which of the jury’s shortcomings 
are also characteristic of judges.”); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About 
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1230-
31 (1992) (“Judge decision-making has been largely neglected in studies of the tort system, 
suggesting that juries have been serving well their function as a lightning rod for the judi-
ciary.”). 
 7. See Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 6, at 327-28. 
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II.   METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES FOR COMPARING JURORS AND 
JUDGES 
 It is certainly reasonable to expect differences in how juries and 
judges decide legal cases. Justice Breyer has noted that “one cannot 
expect . . . jurors to interpret law like judges, who work within a dis-
cipline and hierarchical organization that normally promotes roughly 
uniform interpretation and application of the law.”8 By virtue of their 
differing backgrounds and experiences, one might reasonably predict 
differences in decisionmaking. In addition, one might expect the dif-
ferent structures of the decisionmaking processes to create some di-
vergence. For example, trial court judges make decisions as indi-
viduals, while juries decide cases as groups. However, both juries 
and judges are human decisionmakers—sharing basic human cogni-
tive processes—who are called upon to make complicated decisions. 
 At bottom, juries and judges probably do not differ wildly in their 
decisionmaking, nor is it likely that they would make identical deci-
sions in all circumstances. It is more likely that juries and judges 
make decisions in legal cases that are mostly similar, but that di-
verge in some instances. The challenge is to identify the ways in 
which juries and judges are similar and to distinguish those ways in 
which their decisionmaking differs. As Lempert argues: “Whatever 
research may show, the essential point is that it must be compara-
tive. Both jury and judge must be subject to scrutiny.”9 
 Researchers have attempted to do this comparative research in a 
number of ways, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. 
These include studies of judicial agreement with jury verdicts, com-
parisons of outcomes in bench and jury trials, and simulation re-
search that examines the influences on and processes by which 
judges and jurors make decisions. 
A.   Rates of Judge-Jury Agreement 
 One approach to studying the similarities and differences in the 
decisionmaking of juries and judges is to ask judges to indicate their 
agreement or disagreement with the decisions made by juries in 
cases over which the judges preside. In addition to gathering infor-
mation about the outcome of the case (that is, the verdict or the 
damage award or both), it is possible to ask judges to provide other 
perceptions about the case and the jury. A primary advantage of this 
approach is that each judge and jury evaluate an identical case. A 
second advantage is that the focus is on judge and jury reactions to 
                                                                                                                    
 8. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 596 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 9. Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judg-
ment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 95 (1981). 
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complete, real-world cases. Since both decisionmakers hear all the 
evidence and the arguments, their decisions reflect the influences of 
the entire case. 
 At the same time, however, there are several disadvantages to 
this approach. First, it is difficult to make distinctions in patterns of 
judge-jury agreement among cases using this method.10 If disagree-
ments are confined to subsets of cases with particular characteris-
tics, rates of overall agreement may fail to reveal these moderators. 
 Second, there are a variety of perceptual and judgment difficulties 
with a method that relies on the judge to self-report agreement or 
disagreement with the jury. Judges, like other people, may have dif-
ficulty reporting on their own cognitive processes and identifying the 
factors that affect their decisions.11 Relatedly, research has demon-
strated that people tend to remember and construe information in 
ways that are consistent with the decision they have already made.12 
 A third disadvantage relates to the differing roles of the presiding 
judge and the jury. The trials studied with these methods are, by 
definition, those in which the juries act as the factfinder. The judges, 
rather than acting as finders of fact, act in a presiding role. In this 
role, a judge may behave differently than she does in a bench trial in 
which she is charged with finding the facts and reaching a final deci-
sion in the case. In addition, these roles are interrelated in such a 
way that judges and juries may influence each other’s opinions about 
the case.13 
 Finally, some studies using this approach have asked judges to 
indicate their agreement or disagreement with the jury after the jury 
has rendered a verdict, rather than asking judges to independently 
indicate what their decision would have been prior to learning the 
jury verdict. Knowing the jury’s verdict may cause a judge to differ-
ently evaluate aspects of the case that might affect his or her agree-
ment. Relatedly, it is possible that judges may indicate agreement 
with a jury verdict that they found reasonable, even if it was not the 
verdict they would have returned.14 Moreover, judges’ responses may 
also be influenced by their overall attitude toward the jury system; 
                                                                                                                    
 10. Id. at 103. 
 11. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More than We Can 
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231 (1977). 
 12. See Mara Mather et al., Misremembrance of Options Past: Source Monitoring and 
Choice, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 132, 132 (2000).  
 13. See Peter David Blanck, What Empirical Research Tells Us: Studying Judges’ and 
Juries’ Behavior, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 777 (1991); Peter David Blanck et al., Note, The 
Appearance of Justice: Judges’ Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985). 
 14. Lempert, supra note 9, at 102 (“[A] judge’s recollections may be colored by the 
verdict returned. In particular, a judge who thought the case close might report agreement 
with any jury verdict.”). 
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that is, judges with positive views of the jury system may be more 
likely to report agreement with the jury. A better variant on this ap-
proach would be to ask judges to give their verdicts prior to learning 
the verdict of the jury.15 
B.   Archival Analysis 
 A second approach to comparing judges and jurors involves exam-
ining cases that have been decided by either judges or juries and 
comparing the outcomes. One of the main advantages of archival 
studies is their high verisimilitude, or ecological validity.16 These 
studies examine decisions in real cases in which judges or juries 
were faced with full case facts, subtleties of evidence, and complete 
legal instructions and were required to make decisions with real con-
sequences. With enough cases and a detailed system for carefully 
coding case and decisionmaker characteristics, statistical analysis 
can be used to identify patterns and associations between aspects of 
the cases and the decisions made. In addition, archival research, 
unlike the other methods discussed here, does not require judge or 
jury participation in the research process. Thus, archival research 
enjoys the practical advantage of not needing to secure the coopera-
tion of judges—a group from which it is notoriously difficult to secure 
participation. 
 The difficulty with using the results in decided cases to compare 
the decisionmaking of judges and juries is that the judges and juries 
have heard different cases. Each case presents a host of subtle and 
not so subtle differences—in their facts, injuries, legal claims, legal 
representation, and parties—which might provide an alternative ex-
planation for any differences obtained. The challenge for archival re-
search, then, is to identify the relevant variables and devise a way to 
measure them in order to statistically control them. The ability to 
code and control for variables of interest, however, is frequently lim-
ited by the (often insufficient) court records kept. Finally, even if 
done well, archival research identifies correlations between and 
among variables, but not causal relationships.17 
                                                                                                                    
 15. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A 
Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
171 (2005). 
 16. Ecological validity refers to the degree to which the conditions of the study repro-
duce the real world conditions. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.  
 17. For discussions of archival research methods generally, see MacCoun, supra note 
2, at 141-42, and Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict 
Statistics: Cautions About the Lorelei’s Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599 (1994). 
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C.   Experimental Simulations 
 A third approach utilizes experimental methodology, which gives 
the researcher the ability to isolate and manipulate variables of in-
terest and to eliminate alternative explanations. In a typical experi-
ment, a large number of participants evaluate the same simulated 
case.18 All characteristics of the case are held constant; the only at-
tribute varied is the characteristic or procedure to be studied. Thus, 
observed differences in responses, such as verdicts, can be attributed 
to the variable of interest, unconfounded by other influences. Simu-
lation methodology allows isolation of specific variables, permits ob-
servation of deliberation processes, and allows experimental manipu-
lation of legal rules and procedures as well as case and party charac-
teristics.19 Thus, in order to compare judges and jurors, both groups 
would be asked to evaluate the same case and their responses would 
be compared. Differences in their responses can then be attributed to 
differences between judges and jurors, rather than to differences in 
the cases faced by each group. 
 Experimental simulations, however, are limited in the degree to 
which the research setting can reflect the relevant legal conditions. 
Departures from the conditions of actual trials may include using 
written vignettes, participants that do not reflect the jury pool, or 
choosing not to include group deliberations. Moreover, no matter how 
sophisticated the simulation, it is still a simulation.20 Concern about 
the ability to generalize the experimental simulation research cen-
ters on this lack of ecological validity.21 However, it is not necessary 
that a study mirror the conditions of an actual trial for the study to 
have high external validity.22 As long as the experimental simulation 
elicits responses similar to those in the real world, it has high gener-
                                                                                                                    
 18. Because it is not feasible to randomly assign cases to be decided by judge or jury, I 
focus here primarily on simulation studies rather than field experiments. 
 19. See generally Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is 
the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999); Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, 
Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Methodological Consid-
erations, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107, 117 (1979); Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations 
and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997); MacCoun, supra 
note 2, at 143-44; Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury 
Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71, 
75-83 (1979). 
 20. See Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of 
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2005). 
 21. Id. 
 22. External validity essentially concerns the extent to which a set of research find-
ings can be generalized. The construct applies to generalizations across various persons, 
times, and settings as well as to generalizations to specific persons, times, and settings. 
See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & 
ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS (1979). 
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alizability even if it does not precisely replicate the particular legal 
setting.23 
D.   The Utility of Multiple Methods 
 Certainly it would be unwise to rely on a single study as disposi-
tive of a research question.24 Similarly, it would be unwise to rely on 
a single methodology to explore a research question. A more com-
plete and nuanced understanding of a phenomenon comes not only 
from multiple studies, but from multiple studies done by different re-
searchers, using a variety of methods, participant populations, ap-
proaches, and materials. This is true because each study has unique 
advantages and disadvantages, and reading multiple studies to-
gether makes the most of the advantages while minimizing the dis-
advantages. To the extent that studies using multiple methods (for 
example, archival studies and experimental simulations) converge on 
a common understanding of a phenomenon, greater confidence in the 
results can be had. To the extent that the results differ, attempts can 
be made to explain the divergence. Each study, by itself, is interest-
ing, but it is when a number of studies are read together that a more 
complete picture of the phenomenon of interest is likely to emerge. 
III.   JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF JURORS 
 One approach to comparing juries and judges is to ask judges to 
indicate their agreement or disagreement with the decisions made by 
juries in cases over which they preside. Judge-jury agreement has 
been assessed in large numbers of individual cases; these studies 
consistently find relatively high rates of judge-jury agreement. More 
general estimates by judges of the rate at which they agree with ju-
ries in all the cases in which they have presided show similarly high 
rates of agreement. In addition, judges surveyed about their percep-
tions of jury decisionmaking tend to report relatively high levels of 
satisfaction with juries. 
A.   Judge-Jury Agreement Studies 
 Kalven and Zeisel conducted the classic large-scale comparison of 
judges and jurors in both criminal and civil cases.25 Examining 3576 
                                                                                                                    
 23. See Bornstein, supra note 19, at 84. Unfortunately, explicit comparisons of behav-
ior in the real world with behavior under various lab conditions are somewhat rare. 
 24. See Greene et al., supra note 2, at 247 (“[I]t is a rare individual study that is able 
to address all of these issues. More importantly, it is not clear that individual studies 
should address every issue.”); Michael J. Saks, Improving APA Science Translation Amicus 
Briefs, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 235, 240 (1993) (noting the “nearly universal consensus 
that a single study is not sufficient”). 
 25. Kalven, supra note 4, at 1056 & n.3; HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE 
AMERICAN JURY 12 (1966). 
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criminal trials, they found that judges reported that they would have 
made the same guilt determinations as did the jury 78% of the 
time.26 In 3% of the cases, the jury convicted when the judge would 
have acquitted; in 19% of the cases, the jury acquitted (or hung) 
when the judge would have convicted.27 Of those cases in which there 
was agreement to convict on the same charge and in which the jury 
set the sentence, judges indicated agreement with the jury sentence 
in 57% of the cases.28 
 Notably, Kalven and Zeisel found that judges did not attribute 
disagreements to jury misunderstandings.29 In addition, they found 
that the rates of judge-jury disagreement were comparable not only 
in cases classified by the judges as easy to understand, but also in 
difficult cases. Instead, higher rates of judge-jury disagreement were 
found in cases that the judges classified as “close” than in cases de-
scribed as “clear.”30 
 Kalven and Zeisel found similar results for civil cases. Across ap-
proximately 4000 civil cases, judges reported that their liability deci-
sions would have matched the juries’ decisions 78% of the time.31 The 
disagreements were evenly split among cases in which the jury found 
for the plaintiff when the judge would have found for the defendant 
(12%) and those in which the jury found for the defendant when the 
judge would have found for the plaintiff (10%).32 In cases in which 
both judge and jury would have awarded damages, judges reported 
that they would have awarded less than the jury awarded in 52% of 
                                                                                                                    
 26. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra 25, at 58 tbl.12 (showing that in 14% of cases, both judge 
and jury would acquit (or hung); in 64% of cases, both judge and jury would convict). Here 
“convicting” refers to convicting on some charge. See id. at 60. 
 27. Id. at 59. 
 28. Id. at 61 tbl.14. Judges would have sentenced more leniently in 16% of these cases 
and would have sentenced more harshly in 26% of these cases. Id. “[T]he jury agrees with 
the judge often enough to be reassuring, yet disagrees often enough to keep it interesting.” 
Kalven, supra note 4, at 1064. 
 29. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 25, at 152-53 (“[T]he judge almost never advances 
the inability of the jury to understand as a reason for disagreement.”). Kalven and Zeisel 
also found that jury “verdicts move basically with the weight and direction of the evi-
dence.” Id. at 162.  
 30. Id. at 157. In clear cases, the disagreement rate was quite low whether the case 
was classified as easy (9%) or difficult (8%). In contrast, higher rates of disagreement were 
found in both easy (41%) and difficult (39%) cases that were classified as close cases. Id. at 
157 tbl.50. 
The result is a stunning refutation of the hypothesis that the jury does not un-
derstand. While, as we can see, jury disagreement is greater in close cases than 
in clear ones, there is virtually no difference between the frequency of dis-
agreement when the case is easy and when the case is difficult; this holds true 
for the cases that are clear as well as for the close ones. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 31. Id. at 63 tbl.16 & n.11. In 47% of cases both would have found for the plaintiff; in 
31% of cases both would have found for the defendant. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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cases, more than the jury awarded in 39% of cases, and approxi-
mately the same amount as the jury awarded in 9% of the cases.33 On 
average, Kalven and Zeisel found that juries’ damage awards were 
approximately 20% higher than judges reported they would have 
awarded.34 
 More recently, in a similar study, Heuer and Penrod examined 
judge-jury agreement in seventy-seven criminal and sixty-seven civil 
trials across thirty-three states.35 For the criminal trials, judges re-
ported that they would have made the same guilt determinations as 
did the jury in approximately 73% of cases.36 In approximately 3% of 
the cases, the jury convicted when the judge would have acquitted; in 
approximately 25% of the cases, the jury acquitted (or hung) when 
the judge would have convicted.37 For the civil trials, judges reported 
that their liability decisions would have been the same as the juries’ 
in approximately 63% of the cases.38 Disagreements were evenly split 
between cases in which judges reported that they would have found 
for the defendant when the jury found for the plaintiff (18%) and 
those in which judges reported that they would have found for the 
plaintiff when the jury found for the defendant (19%).39 Like Kalven 
and Zeisel, Heuer and Penrod found no relation between the com-
plexity of the trial or the trial procedures and rates of judge-jury 
agreement.40 
 Finally, Eisenberg and his colleagues looked at judge-jury agree-
ment rates in a sample of 300 criminal trials in four jurisdictions.41 
Judges filled out two questionnaires, one before the jury reached its 
verdict and another following the verdict. The agreement rates were 
strikingly similar to those found by Kalven and Zeisel: judges would 
have made the same guilt determinations as did the jury 75% of the 
time.42 In 6% of the cases, the jury convicted when the judge would 
have acquitted; in 19% of the cases, the jury acquitted when the 
                                                                                                                    
 33. See Kalven, supra note 4, at 1065. 
 34. Id.; see also GORDON BERMANT ET AL., PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALS: VIEWS FROM 
THE BENCH AND THE BAR 41-42 (1981) (reporting findings from a study of 18,528 federal 
trials terminated between July 1, 1976 and December 31, 1978). Bermant and his col-
leagues found that “rates of appeals after bench [24%] and jury trials [22%] are practically 
identical” and that rates of successful appeals (resulting in reversal or remand) were com-
parable as well (19% of bench trials and 17% of jury trials). Id. at 42. 
 35. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its 
Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 34, 48 (1994) [hereinafter Heuer & 
Penrod, Trial Complexity]. 
 36. Id. at 48 tbl.12.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 48 tbl.13. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 48-49. 
 41. Eisenberg et al., supra note 15, at 173. 
 42. Id. at 180, 181 tbl.1. In 13% of cases, both judge and jury would acquit; in 62% of 
cases, both judge and jury would convict. Id. at 181 tbl.1.  
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judge would have convicted.43 Consistent with other studies of this 
type, Eisenberg and his colleagues found no relation between the 
rate of disagreement and the complexity of the trial.44 Instead, the 
juries appeared to apply a higher standard for finding guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.45 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF JUDGE-JURY AGREEMENT STUDIES 
 AGREEMENT JUDGE LENIENT JURY LENIENT 
Criminal Cases    
   Kalven & Zeisel (1969) 78% 3% 19% 
   Heuer & Penrod (1994) 73% 3% 25% 
   Eisenberg et al. (2004) 75% 6% 19% 
    
Civil Cases    
   Kalven & Zeisel (1966) 78% 12% 10% 
   Heuer & Penrod (1994) 63% 18% 19% 
 
 Interestingly, the rates of judge-jury agreement found in these 
studies compare favorably to rates of agreement between decision-
makers considering other types of complex decisions. Diamond re-
viewed studies reporting rates of agreement for a variety of different 
decisionmakers who performed a variety of judgment tasks. Judge-
jury agreement rates (78%) fare well when stacked up against scien-
tists engaged in peer review (75% agreement rate), employment in-
terviewers (70%), psychiatrists diagnosing psychiatric illness (70%), 
and physicians diagnosing physical illness (67%-77%).46 
 Importantly, these judge-jury agreement rates are also compara-
ble to the rates of agreement among judges themselves. Diamond 
and Zeisel examined the sentencing recommendations of judges par-
ticipating in sentencing councils.47 Before the meeting of each coun-
cil, each judge was provided with the presentencing report and then 
                                                                                                                    
 43. Id. Note that asymmetry is not universal—the judge convicts more when evidence 
is medium or strong (from either perspective), but the judge convicts less in cases in which 
the judge thinks evidence is weak. Id. at 186-89. 
 44. Id. at 192. Eisenberg and his colleagues measured complexity in terms of eviden-
tiary complexity and in terms of legal complexity and from the perspective of judges and of 
jurors. Id. at 190-92. 
 45. Id. at 191. 
 46. Shari Seidman Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court Deci-
sions, in 2 THE MASTER LECTURE SERIES: PYSCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 119, 125 (C. James 
Scheirer & Barbara L. Hammonds eds., 1983); see also STEPHEN L. FIELDING, THE 
PRACTICE OF UNCERTAINTY 52 (1999). 
 47. Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence 
Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 109 (1975). 
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recorded a recommendation for sentencing.48 Diamond and Zeisel 
found that judges agreed on whether the offender should be sen-
tenced to prison approximately 70% of the time.49 Thus, the judge-
jury agreement rates reported above comport closely with the inter-
judge agreement rates. Commenting on such comparisons, Saks 
noted that “[t]he jury’s concordance rates are particularly impressive 
given its unique situation of having to deal with a body of cases from 
which the easiest 80-95% have been removed.”50 
B.   Other Estimates of Judge-Jury Agreement 
 In other studies, judges estimated their rates of agreement with 
juries in cases over which they have presided. For example, a recent 
survey of 393 Texas state trial judges and 594 federal trial court 
judges found that large majorities of judges reported agreeing with 
the jury all or most of the time.51 These estimates of judge-jury 
agreement rates across all of the judges’ cases are likely to be less 
accurate than the estimates obtained by studies asking judges to re-
port their agreement in individual cases. In addition to the difficul-
ties attendant to asking judges to report agreement or disagreement 
detailed above, judges are likely to experience a variety of difficulties 
in making estimates across a wide variety of cases, including faulty 
memory and overreliance on cases that are highly available in mem-
ory.52 Nonetheless, the results of these studies are consistent with 
the results of the judge-jury agreement studies reported above and 
contribute to a picture of high levels of agreement between judges 
and juries. 
                                                                                                                    
 48. Id. at 117. The sentencing judge was responsible for making the final sentencing 
decision, but that decision was informed by the recommendations and discussion of the 
council. Id. 
 49. Id. at 119 tbl.2. For those cases in which the judges agreed that the offender 
should be incarcerated, the judges’ rate of agreement as to the length of the sentence was 
quite low—12% in one council and 10% in the other. Id. at 120 tbl.3. In comparison, when 
the judges agreed that the offender should be given a noncustodial sentence, the rate of 
agreement on the length of that sentence was quite high—98% in one council and 82% in 
the other. Id. 
 50. Saks, supra note 6, at 1236. 
 51. John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1684 n.10 (2001) 
(finding that 92.1% of the federal sample and 90.5% of the state court sample reported 
agreement in “most” cases; and 4.7% of the federal sample and 5.1% of the state court 
sample reported agreeing with the jury “all of the time”). 
 52. Using the availability heuristic, individuals judge the likelihood of an event by 
the ease with which they can recall examples of similar events. See generally Amos Tver-
sky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163 (Daniel Kahneman et al. 
eds., 1982). 
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 Sentell conducted a series of surveys of 101 state53 and seventeen 
federal trial judges in Georgia.54 He provided participants with find-
ings from Kalven and Zeisel’s study and asked them how their ex-
perience compared. When presented with the finding that judges 
agreed with the liability determination of the jury in at least 79% of 
cases, the vast majority of the judges reported similar or even higher 
rates of agreement.55 Similarly, when presented with Kalven and 
Zeisel’s pattern of agreement with damage awards, the majority of 
judges indicated that this was consistent with their experience.56 
When asked about the reasons for judge-jury disagreement, most 
Georgia judges agreed with Kalven and Zeisel’s assessment that pro-
plaintiff leanings by the jury57 and the jury’s inability to under-
stand58 did not cause judge-jury disagreements. Given potential sus-
ceptibility to anchoring and to leading questions, this level of agree-
ment is perhaps not surprising. The study does, however, at least 
demonstrate that judges find Kalven and Zeisel’s findings plausible. 
C.   Judges’ Perceptions of Juries 
 Surveys of judges also suggest that the judiciary generally holds a 
positive view of the jury. Judges report high levels of satisfaction 
with the jury system overall59 and view the jury system as an essen-
                                                                                                                    
 53. R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 
26 GA. L. REV. 85, 94-95 (1991) [hereinafter Sentell, The View from the Bench]. 
 54. R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the (Fed-
eral) Bench, 27 GA. L. REV. 59, 66-68 (1992) [hereinafter Sentell, Federal Bench]. 
 55. Sentell, The View from the Bench, supra note 53, at 98-99 (87% of state sample 
reported that their rate of agreement was “about the same”; 10% as higher; 3% as lower); 
Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 54, at 71 (56% of the federal sample reported that their 
rate of agreement was “about the same”; 44% reported higher rates of agreement). 
 56. Among those judges indicating that their experience differed, there appeared to 
be a split between those who thought that judges would make higher awards in more cases 
and those who thought that juries would make higher awards in more cases. In addition, 
Sentell noted that many judges indicated that they agreed with the jury award in a higher 
percentage of cases than that found by Kalven and Zeisel. Sentell, The View from the 
Bench, supra note 53, at 103-04; Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 54, at 74-75. When 
presented with the finding that, on average, juries awarded 20% more than the judges 
would have in the same cases, 52% of the Georgia state court judges and 44% of the Geor-
gia federal court judges indicated that their experience was comparable. Of those judges 
who indicated that their experience differed, some agreed that juries awarded more than 
judges would have but disagreed as to how much, and others indicated that the judge 
would have awarded more. Sentell, The View from the Bench, supra note 53, at 104-06; 
Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 54, at 77. 
 57. Sentell, The View from the Bench, supra note 53, at 109-11 (86% agree; 14% dis-
agree); Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 54, at 80 (87% agree; 13% disagree). 
 58. Sentell, The View from the Bench, supra note 53, at 113-15 (94% agree jury gen-
erally able to understand; 6% disagree (several limited to “difficult cases” or inability of 
lawyers)); Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 54, at 82 (94% agree; 6% (1 respondent) dis-
agree in complex cases). 
 59. The judges studied by Kalven and Zeisel reported general overall satisfaction 
with the jury. For criminal cases, 77% reported that the jury system was “thoroughly satis-
factory” and only 3% found the jury system unsatisfactory such that its use “should be 
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tial safeguard.60 Judges overwhelmingly believe that juries attempt 
to follow the judge’s legal instructions,61 demonstrate understanding 
of the issues in the cases they hear,62 and are not swayed by emo-
tion.63 
 Judges also recognize challenges for the jury system. One survey 
found that many judges would support studying alternatives to trial 
by jury for certain types of cases.64 Concern about the jury was ex-
pressed in particular in the context of complex civil cases, where a 
majority of the judges believed that “in complex civil cases, the jurors 
need more guidance than they usually get.”65 Slight majorities of the 
judges nonetheless rejected the idea of limiting use of juries for com-
                                                                                                                    
sharply curtailed.” For civil cases, support was slightly lower, but remained high with 64% 
reporting thorough satisfaction and 9% reporting that the system should be curtailed. 
Kalven, supra note 4, at 1073. Sentell also found relatively high levels of support for the 
jury among judges—for civil cases, 76.5% of the federal judges surveyed found the jury 
system “thoroughly satisfactory” and none found it unsatisfactory. Sentell, Federal Bench, 
supra note 54, at 87. State court judges also reported a high degree of satisfaction, though 
somewhat less than the federal judges—57% of the state court judges surveyed found the 
jury system “thoroughly satisfactory” and only 2% found it unsatisfactory. Sentell, The 
View from the Bench, supra note 53, at 120. Most of the judges surveyed reported similar 
levels of satisfaction with juries in criminal cases. Id. at 123; Sentell, Federal Bench, supra 
note 54, at 89. The vast majority of the respondents in the SMU/Dallas Morning News sur-
vey indicated that they thought that juries did “very well” or “moderately well” in reaching 
“just and fair” verdicts. Attanasio, supra note 51, at 1684 n.8 (98.6% of the federal trial 
judges and 98.3% of the Texas state court judges). In addition, large majorities believed 
that the jury system is “fine just the way it is” or is in “good” condition needing only minor 
work. Id. at 1684 n.9 (91.1% of the federal judges and 87.8% of the Texas state court 
judges). 
 60. A 1987 Louis Harris & Associates survey of 800 state and 200 federal judges who 
spent at least half of their time on civil cases found that just over three-quarters of the 
judges agreed that “for routine civil cases, the right to trial by jury is an essential safe-
guard which must be retained.” Louis Harris & Assoc., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Is-
sues: A Survey of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on 
General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746 (1989) [hereinafter Louis Harris]. 
 61. See, e.g., Sentell, The View from the Bench, supra note 53, at 126 (93% of the state 
judges); Sentell, Federal Bench, supra note 54, at 91 (100% of the federal court judges); 
Louis Harris, supra note 60, at 746 (finding that 99% of the federal judges and 98% of the 
state judges agreed that “jurors usually make a serious effort to apply the law as they are 
instructed”); see also BERMANT ET AL., supra note 34, at 52 (“Judges and lawyers were uni-
formly complimentary of the diligence of the juries in these cases; with slightly less una-
nimity, they also affirmed the validity of the juries’ deliberative processes.”). 
 62. Louis Harris, supra note 60, at 746 (finding that 73% of the federal judges and 
66% of the state judges disagreed with the statement that “too often jurors fail to apply the 
law because they aren’t able to understand it”); Michelle L. Hartmann, Is It a Short Trip 
Back to Manor Farm? A Study of Judicial Attitudes and Behaviors Concerning the Civil 
Jury System, 54 SMU L. REV. 1827, 1853 (2001) (finding that 93.4% of the federal court 
judges and 83.9% of the state court judges believed that jurors understand the legal and 
evidentiary issues “very well” or “moderately well”).  
 63. Louis Harris, supra note 60, at 746 (finding that 80% of the federal judges and 
69% of the state judges disagreed with the statement that “the feelings jurors have about 
the parties often cause them to make inappropriate decisions”). 
 64. Id. at 747 tbl.7.1 (63% of the federal judges and 68% of the state judges). 
 65. Id. at 746 (66% of the federal judges and 62% of the state judges). 
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plex civil cases66 or for “complicated business cases.”67 Instead, a ma-
jority of the judges favored limitations on the use of juries for “minor 
civil cases involving small sums of money.”68 
IV.   ARCHIVAL STUDIES OF OUTCOMES 
 Another approach to the judge-jury question compares “win rates” 
between cases heard by juries and those heard by judges. As noted 
above, the benefit of this approach is that it examines the actual de-
cisions of judges in cases in which they are the decisionmaker, rather 
than examining their sense of agreement after the fact. 
 Using the Administrative Office of the United States Courts data-
base, Clermont and Eisenberg compared outcomes in federal civil 
cases tried before judges and juries between 1979 and 1989.69 They 
found that in most types of cases there were no differences in plain-
tiff win rates before judges and juries.70 They did find, however, that 
plaintiffs were more successful in front of judges in several types of 
cases—most notably products liability, medical malpractice, and mo-
tor vehicle cases.71 In addition, they found a correlation between 
plaintiff win rates in judge and jury trials across different case types, 
concluding that “[p]laintiffs tend to do well before judges in the same 
case categories in which they tend to do well before juries.”72 
 Several studies of this type have used data from the Civil Trial 
Court Network (CTCN). For example, Eisenberg and his colleagues 
used this database to compare the decisions of juries and judges 
across 9000 state court civil cases from 1996.73 Overall, they found 
that plaintiffs were more successful in front of judges (62% plaintiff 
win rate) than in front of juries (47% plaintiff win rate), though rates 
varied by type of case.74 Controlling for the size of the compensatory 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Id. at 747 (52% of the federal judges and 59% of the state judges). 
 67. Id. (60% of the federal judges and 58% of the state judges). 
 68. Id. (52% of the federal judges and 71% of the state judges). A small majority of 
judges agreed that “in some complex civil cases, trial before a panel of experts would be 
preferable to trial by jury.” Id. at 748 tbl.7.2 (53% of the federal judges and 51% of the 
state judges). Overall, most judges in the SMU/Dallas Morning News study thought that 
the right to a jury trial ought to be “left the same” or even expanded, a substantial minor-
ity favored some reduction, and very few favored eliminating the jury. Attanasio, supra 
note 51, at 1685 n.16. Similarly, while some judges favored using juries in fewer types of 
cases and a handful favored expanding the types of cases that juries hear, most judges fa-
vored the status quo. Id. 
 69. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1133. 
 70. Id. at 1137.  
 71. Id. Plaintiffs were more successful in front of juries only in marine personal injury 
and Federal Employer’s Liability Act cases. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1138. In some types of cases, juries awarded more in damages; however, in 
other types of cases, judges awarded more. Id. at 1141. 
 73. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical 
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 747-49 (2002). 
 74. Id. at 749-50. 
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award, the status of the parties, and the type of case, Eisenberg and 
his colleagues found no differences between judges and juries in the 
frequency with which they awarded punitive damages, in the 
amounts of the awards, or in the amount of punitive damages 
awarded per unit of compensatory damages.75 They did find, how-
ever, that judges (more so than juries) became more likely to award 
punitive damages as compensatory damages increased,76 and they 
found some evidence suggesting that punitive damage awards made 
by juries were somewhat more variable than were those of judges.77 
 In a later study, Eisenberg, Rachlinski, and Wells used the subset 
of cases from the CTCN database in which plaintiffs won and were 
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages awards to explore 
whether the ratio of punitive and compensatory damages awarded by 
judges and juries differed by the type of case tried.78 They found evi-
dence that judges and juries awarded similar amounts in punitive 
damages per unit of compensatory damages in non-bodily injury 
cases, but that judges had higher punitive-compensatory damages 
ratios in cases involving bodily injury than did juries.79 
 Hersch and Viscusi analyzed the CTCN dataset using different 
specifications.80 They found that juries were more likely to award 
punitive damages than were judges81 and that juries awarded higher 
amounts in compensatory82 and punitive83 damages than did judges, 
though this effect appeared to be limited to the high end of the range 
of awards.84 They attribute the differences between their findings 
and those of Eisenberg and his colleagues to differences in specifica-
tions in the models used—specifically whether the county of the trial 
was controlled and the inclusion (in the Eisenberg model) of an in-
teraction term. 
 Other studies have examined bench and jury trials in particular 
types of cases. Helland and Tabarrok used data on personal injury 
cases tried between 1988 and 1996 and reported in Jury Verdict Re-
                                                                                                                    
 75. Id. at 760, 774. 
 76. Id. (finding that juries were more likely to award punitive damages when com-
pensatory damages were low and that judges were more likely to award punitive damages 
when compensatory damages were high). 
 77. Id. at 775-76 (significant results dependent on inclusion of a particular county). 
However, the awards made by juries and judges were equally likely to be so extreme as to 
be outside the range in which 95% of the judges’ awards fell. Id. 
 78. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World 
Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1248-49 (2002). 
 79. Id. at 1253-56. 
 80. Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Per-
form, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004). 
 81. Id. at 26. 
 82. Id. at 29. 
 83. Id. at 24. 
 84. Id. at 28. 
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search’s Personal Injury Verdicts and Settlements.85 They found that, 
overall, plaintiffs fared better on liability decisions in front of judges, 
while juries awarded more in damages in cases in which plaintiffs 
won.86 They tested the influence of several factors on the damage 
awards of juries and judges and found several differences: caps on 
punitive damages were associated with smaller awards in jury trials, 
but not in bench trials; the collateral source rule was associated with 
larger awards in jury trials, but not in bench trials; and trials held in 
counties with higher poverty rates were associated with higher 
awards in jury trials, but smaller awards in bench trials.87 
 Using data from the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, Moore analyzed the 1209 federal patent cases that were re-
solved by either a bench trial or a jury trial between 1983 and 1999.88 
Overall, she found that juries were more likely to find for the patent 
holder than for the patent infringer, while judges were equally likely 
to find for either party.89 Additional differences were found in com-
plex cases. When both the validity of the patent and whether it had 
been infringed were raised within a case, juries (86%) were more 
likely than were judges (74%) to find for the same party on both is-
sues.90 Similarly, when the infringement of multiple patents was 
raised in a single case, juries (87%) were more likely than were 
judges (72%) to find for the same party.91 Overall, juries awarded 
more in damages than did judges, although both groups awarded 
more than $5 million in similar proportions of the cases they heard.92 
Affirmance rates on appeal for bench and jury trials were virtually 
identical.93 
 These studies show a great deal of similarity in the decisions 
made by judges and juries, as well as some notable differences. Im-
                                                                                                                    
 85. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and the 
Jury, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 309-10 (2000); see Vidmar, supra note 17, at 600 (describ-
ing difficulties with using verdict report data). 
 86. Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 85, at 310. 
 87. Id. at 326-28. 
 88. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside 
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380 (2000).  
 89. Id. at 386 (juries found for the patent holder in 68% of cases; judges found for the 
patent holder in 51% of cases). Moore also analyzed the data by substantive issue, compar-
ing outcomes on each of four substantive issues: validity; enforceability; infringement; and 
willfulness. She found that both juries and judges were more likely to find patents valid 
than invalid, more likely to find patents enforceable than unenforceable, and more likely 
to find patents infringed than not infringed. Only juries were more likely to find patents 
willfully infringed than not willfully infringed. Id. at 390-91. Overall, juries were more 
likely to find patents valid, infringed, and willfully infringed than were judges; judges and 
juries were equally likely to find patents enforceable. Id. at 390. 
 90. Id. at 403.  
 91. Id. at 404. Whether the patent holder or the infringer files suit was a significant 
predictor of who wins in jury trials, but not bench trials. Id. at 405. 
 92. Id. at 395 (17% of bench trials and 21% of jury trials). 
 93. Id. at 397 (78% affirmance rate for both). 
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portantly, there is evidence that judges’ and juries’ decisions are cor-
related and that they consider the same or similar factors when mak-
ing decisions. There is mixed evidence about whether judges or juries 
give higher damage awards. The reality is likely more nuanced than 
a generalized finding that one decisionmaker awards more than the 
other. Research in this area should focus on identifying the condi-
tions under which the damage award decisions of juries and judges 
depart from each other. 
 It is difficult, however, to make these nuanced conclusions about 
the substantive differences in the decisionmaking of judges and ju-
rors from these studies. There is evidence in the studies that juries 
and judges are faced with differing case mixes. For example, Cler-
mont and Eisenberg found substantial differences in the rates at 
which different types of cases are heard by judges and juries.94 It is 
quite possible that strategic decisions by litigants result in collec-
tions of cases with different attributes going before jurors and 
judges.95 Clermont and Eisenberg concluded that their data are ex-
plained best by “small differences between judges’ and juries’ treat-
ment of cases and, more importantly, in the parties’ varying the se-
lection of cases that reach judge and jury,” and they argue that these 
selection effects are driven by popular misperceptions of the differ-
ences between juries and judges.96 Similarly, Helland and Tabarrok 
concluded that a large proportion of the differences they found be-
tween juries and judges is explained by differences in the cases 
faced.97 Thus, care must be used in drawing conclusions about the 
differences and similarities between judges and juries on the basis of 
these studies alone—there are likely factors other than the identity 
of the factfinder that influenced the results. Nonetheless, the find-
ings of these studies provide useful insight into the comparison and 
can be read in conjunction with the results of other studies using dif-
ferent methodologies. 
V.   EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
 Both judge-jury agreement studies and archival studies examine 
the responses of decisionmakers to real-world cases. The judge-jury 
agreement studies have the advantage of examining reactions to 
                                                                                                                    
 94. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1141 (finding that juries are more likely 
to hear personal injury cases and that judges are more likely to hear non-personal injury 
cases). 
 95. See id. (discussing selection effects); Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 85 (same). 
See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 96. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1126. 
 97. Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 85, at 330 (finding two-thirds to three-fourths of 
the difference in awards were explained by differences in the cases). 
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identical cases, but the judges and juries are acting in different roles. 
The archival studies examine the decisions of both groups when they 
are charged with ultimate decisionmaking responsibility, but the 
cases decided by the two groups are not identical. Experimental 
studies that ask jurors and judges to evaluate identical case facts al-
low for a comparison between the two sets of decisionmakers without 
the confound of different case mixes. Experimental methods also al-
low the examination of processes that underlie ultimate verdicts, 
such as whether the decisionmaker made appropriate use of evidence 
or legal rules. 
 Ideally, an experimental comparison between judges and juries 
would compare the responses of a sample of judges to the responses 
of a sample of mock juries. Very few, if any, studies fit this ideal 
model. A more common approach is to compare the responses of 
judges and individual jurors, but there are also relatively few studies 
of this type.98 In addition, there are studies of judicial decisionmak-
ing and studies of juror decisionmaking that have been conducted in 
similar domains and can be compared. These experimental studies, 
like the studies reviewed above, show a high degree of similarity in 
the decisionmaking of judges and jurors. 
A.   Consideration of the Evidence 
 One domain in which the decisionmaking of both jurors and 
judges has been examined is how each uses the evidence at trial. In 
general, the research has shown that despite the many extralegal in-
fluences on juror decisionmaking, the trial evidence is the best pre-
dictor of verdicts.99 However, some types of evidence have proven to 
be more difficult to deal with than others. 
 1.   Scientific, Expert, and Statistical Evidence 
 Jurors are often criticized as unable to effectively evaluate expert, 
scientific, or statistical evidence. A recent review of the empirical re-
search examining jurors’ use of expert testimony concludes that 
“[a]lthough jurors struggle and are occasionally misled, they gener-
ally make reasonable use of complex material, utilizing the expert 
                                                                                                                    
 98. For a discussion of potential differences between individual jurors and deliberat-
ing juries, see infra Part V.E. 
 99. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 154; MICHAEL J. SAKS & REID HASTIE, 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 68 (1978) (“Indeed, the power of evidence is so well recog-
nized by jury researchers that when studying processes other than evidence, they must 
calibrate the evidence to be moderate so that it leaves some variance to be influenced by 
the variables under study.”); Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of 
Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987). 
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testimony when it is presented in a form that they can use.”100 There 
are, nonetheless, particular types of evidence—scientific and statisti-
cal evidence—with which jurors appear to have the most difficulty.101 
 However, there is little reason to think that judges are any better 
equipped to contend with complex scientific or statistical evidence. 
The educational path of most judges—law school—does not empha-
size training in scientific research methods or statistical reasoning.102 
Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett compared the statistical and meth-
odological reasoning of graduate students in a variety of disci-
plines.103 They found that despite few initial differences across disci-
plines, students in psychology and medicine improved dramatically 
in their ability to engage in statistical-methodological reasoning in 
the first three years of graduate school, while students in law did 
not.104 
 Not surprisingly then, in a national survey of state trial court 
judges, only 52% of participating judges felt that “their education 
                                                                                                                    
 100. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1121, 1166-67 (2001). 
 101. Jurors appear to have difficulty in assessing empirical research. See, e.g., Marga-
ret Bull Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects of Juror Gender and 
Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 84 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 362, 367 (1999) (finding that jurors’ assessments of an empirical study of sexual 
harassment (presented as part of a sexual harassment trial) were not sensitive to differ-
ences in how sexual harassment was measured). Similarly, there is evidence that jurors 
have difficulty with various types of statistical evidence. See, e.g., David L. Faigman & A.J. 
Baglioni, Jr., Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of Sta-
tistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988); Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Ran-
dom Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 
201 (1995); Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: 
Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); William C. Thompson & Ed-
ward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecu-
tor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987). These 
results are consistent with a body of evidence that laypersons generally have difficulty 
with statistical reasoning and with identifying flaws in empirical research. See, e.g., RULES 
FOR REASONING (Richard E. Nisbett ed., 1993); Christopher Jepson et al., Inductive Rea-
soning: Competence or Skill?, 6 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 494 (1983); Richard E. Nisbett et al., 
Teaching Reasoning, 238 SCIENCE 625 (1987) [hereinafter Nisbett et al., Teaching Reason-
ing]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
 102. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) 
(arguing that law schools ought to teach statistics/scientific methodology); Michael Heise, 
The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999); see also Lempert, supra 
note 9, at 91. 
Just as a jury may not include people likely to comprehend the details of com-
plex cases, so a judge, assigned at random, may not be well-equipped to cope 
with complexity. Many judges are bright and diligent, but others are much less 
so, and a legal education does not mean that one will have more than a layper-
son’s understanding of such subjects as economics and statistics. 
Id. 
 103. Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal 
Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431 (1988). 
 104. Id. at 437. 
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had adequately prepared them to deal with the range of scientific 
evidence proffered in their courtrooms”; the other 48% felt inade-
quately prepared to deal with such issues.105 While 63% reported 
having had “CLE training about the use of specific types of scientific 
evidence in the courtroom,” virtually all of the respondents (96%) in-
dicated that they “had not received instruction about general scien-
tific methods and principles.”106 Indeed, recent research provides evi-
dence that judges, like jurors, sometimes have difficulty with assess-
ing the quality of scientific research methods and with statistical 
reasoning. 
(a)   Scientific Evidence 
 Gatowski and her colleagues recently conducted a national survey 
of 400 state trial court judges designed, in part, to assess whether 
trial court judges are able to operationalize the scientific concepts 
that they are required to use as gatekeepers under the Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.107 line of cases.108 Under Daubert, 
trial court judges are required to make “a preliminary assessment of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid” using factors such as whether the theory is falsi-
fiable (that is, whether it “can be (and has been) tested”); whether it 
has been “subjected to peer review and publication”; the “known or 
potential rate of error”;109 and the “general acceptance” of the theory 
in the “relevant scientific community.”110 The survey asked judges to 
describe how they would use these concepts in evaluating whether to 
admit scientific evidence.111 
 Judges were first asked about the concept of falsifiability. While 
88% of judges indicated that falsifiability was a useful factor in 
evaluating scientific evidence, only 6% of judges articulated a de-
scription of how they would use the concept to evaluate evidence that 
indicated a clear understanding of the concept, 59% gave question-
able answers, and 35% of judges gave responses that indicated a lack 
of understanding of the concept.112 Judges’ responses to a question 
about error rate evidenced a similar lack of understanding. While 
91% of the judges in the sample reported finding a consideration of 
error rate as a useful factor in evaluating scientific evidence, only 4% 
                                                                                                                    
 105. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 
(2001). 
 106. Id. 
 107. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
 108. Gatowski et al., supra note 105, at 433.  
 109. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94. 
 110. Id. at 594 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 111. Gatowski et al., supra note 105. 
 112. Id. at 444-45. 
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of them explained how they would use the concept in a way that evi-
denced a clear understanding, 86% gave questionable answers, and 
10% gave answers that evidenced a lack of understanding of the con-
cept.113 Most judges gave responses that indicated a clear under-
standing of the use of peer review and publication (71%) and of gen-
eral acceptance (82%), but some judges had difficulty with these con-
cepts as well (for example, 10% of judges evidenced a lack of under-
standing of the concept of peer review and publication).114 
 Experimental evidence also supports the notion that judges have 
difficulty assessing scientific evidence. Kovera and McAuliff asked 
144 Florida trial court judges to evaluate the admissibility of expert 
testimony in a simulated sexual harassment case.115 They varied the 
description of the study upon which the testimony was based to com-
pare an internally valid version of the study with three methodologi-
cally flawed studies.116 They found that these methodological flaws 
did not significantly influence trial court judges’ decisions about the 
admissibility of the study as evidence.117 In addition, when asked to 
justify their admissibility decisions, few judges mentioned the meth-
odological flaws.118 
 There is also evidence that judges are susceptible to another 
common difficulty that laypersons have with assessing scientific re-
search—biased assimilation. Biased assimilation is the tendency for 
evaluations of the methodology and persuasiveness of empirical re-
search to be influenced by the extent to which the results of the re-
search are consistent with the attitudes or expectations of the person 
doing the evaluation.119 Thus, “judgments about the validity, reliabil-
ity, relevance, and sometimes even the meaning of proffered evidence 
are biased by the apparent consistency of that evidence with the per-
ceiver’s theories and expectations.”120 Redding and Reppucci found a 
pattern of biased assimilation for state court judges and law students 
who were asked to make judgments about social science research on 
                                                                                                                    
 113. Id. at 445-47. 
 114. Id. at 447-48. 
 115. Margaret Bull Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evi-
dence Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gate-
keepers?, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574, 577 (2000). 
 116. Id. at 578. The methodological flaws included experimenter bias, lack of a control 
group, or a confound. Id. 
 117. Id. at 580; see also Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Assessment of the Commonsense 
Psychology Underlying Daubert: Legal Decision Makers’ Abilities to Evaluate Expert Evi-
dence in Hostile Work Environment Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 180 (2002). Find-
ings for attorneys were similar. Id. at 187-89. 
 118. Kovera & McAuliff, supra note 115, at 581. 
 119. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Ef-
fects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). 
 120. Id. at 2099.  
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capital punishment and deterrence.121 The results of the empirical 
studies presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia122 
were varied so that they either supported or failed to support the 
death penalty. Participants judged the research to be more relevant 
to the legal issues, more likely to be admissible, and to have greater 
dispositive weight when the results were consistent with their per-
sonal attitudes about the death penalty than when the results con-
tradicted those attitudes.123 
(b)   Statistical Evidence 
 Similarly, there is evidence that judges, like jurors, have difficulty 
with statistical evidence. Recently, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 
asked 167 federal magistrate judges participating in a workshop by 
the Federal Judicial Center to respond to a series of vignettes. One of 
these vignettes was designed to explore “whether judges would com-
mit the inverse fallacy.”124 Judges were given a res ipsa loquitur 
problem in which the plaintiff was injured and the following facts 
were determined: (1) when the defendant is negligent there is a 90% 
chance of injury, (2) when the defendant is not negligent there is a 
1% chance of injury, and (3) the defendant is negligent one in 1000 
times. Judges were asked to indicate the likelihood that the plaintiff 
was injured due to the negligence of the defendant (the correct an-
swer is 8.3%) by selecting from the categories 0-25%, 26-50%, 51-
75%, or 76-100%.125 Approximately 60% of the judges answered in-
correctly, with most of them selecting the highest category (76-
100%).126 Thus, judges, like jurors, have difficulty using base rate in-
formation. 
 In one of the few studies that has directly compared mock jurors 
and judges, Wells examined the reactions of laypersons and judges to 
“naked statistical evidence” in the context of the Blue Bus problem.127 
                                                                                                                    
 121. Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-Political Atti-
tudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 31 (1999). 
 122. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 123. Redding & Reppucci, supra note 121, at 43. The effects were more pervasive for 
law students (evident in four different ratings) than for judges (evident in ratings of dispo-
sitive weight only). Id. at 44. 
 124. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 808 
(2001). “The inverse fallacy refers to the tendency to treat the probability of a hypothesis 
given the evidence . . . as the same as, or close to, the probability of the evidence given the 
hypothesis . . . .” Id. at 807. 
 125. Id. at 808. 
 126. Id. at 809. 
 127. Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability 
Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992). Wells describes the problem as 
follows: 
An accident occurs in which it is known that a bus was at fault, but the specific 
company is not known. Because the Blue Bus Company accounts for most of 
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In two different studies, Wells found that the subjective probabilities 
and verdict patterns of judges, undergraduate students, and MBA 
students were similar. Across several different versions of the sce-
nario, all three groups made similar subjective assessments of the 
likelihood that the accident was caused by a Blue Bus. Moreover, all 
three groups demonstrated a reluctance to find liability on the basis 
of naked statistical evidence.128 
2.   Inadmissible Evidence 
 In addition to concern about their ability to deal effectively with 
scientific and statistical evidence, jurors are commonly criticized for 
an inability to ignore irrelevant or inadmissible evidence.129 How-
ever, there is evidence that judges, like ordinary citizens, are unable 
to ignore inadmissible evidence. Landsman and Rakos compared the 
responses of eighty-eight judges attending an annual judicial confer-
ence and 104 prospective jurors to three versions of a hypothetical 
vignette.130 The vignettes differed only in how a particular item of 
evidence that favored the plaintiff was treated. In one version, the 
evidence was described and participants were informed of a judicial 
determination to admit the evidence. In a second version, the evi-
dence was described and participants were told that a judge had de-
cided that the evidence was inadmissible. Control participants were 
not told about the evidence.131 Landsman and Rakos found that both 
judges and jurors who heard the evidence were more likely to find 
the defendant liable, whether or not they were told that the evidence 
was inadmissible.132 Interestingly, Landsman and Rakos found that 
while the effect of the biasing information was the same for judges 
                                                                                                                    
the business (say 80%), the balance of probability (in this case 80%) clearly fa-
vors the idea that a Blue Bus Company bus caused this accident. . . .  
 The problem that has plagued the courts and legal scholars is that they at 
once endorse the balance of probability criterion for such suits and also refuse 
to rule in favor of the plaintiff when such evidence is presented. Indeed, suits 
based on naked statistics of this sort are usually thrown out by a summary 
judgment. 
Id. at 740 (citations omitted). 
 128. Id. at 744, 747. 
 129. See Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996); Stanley Sue et al., Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Deci-
sions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (1973); Wil-
liam C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 453 (1981); Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible 
Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Ju-
rors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205 (1977). 
 130. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of 
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 113 (1994). 
 131. Id. at 120-22. 
 132. Id. at 122-23. 
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and jurors, the jurors appeared to be more sensitive to their cognitive 
limitations in disregarding the evidence than did the judges.133 
 More recently, Wistrich, Guthrie, and Rachlinski examined 
judges’ ability to ignore inadmissible evidence in a series of experi-
mental studies.134 Even when they ruled the evidence inadmissible, 
judges were unable to ignore the demands made in settlement dis-
cussions when setting damage awards, an admission that was pro-
tected by attorney-client privilege in determining contract liability, 
the sexual history of the victim in a sexual assault trial, and the 
prior criminal conviction of the plaintiff. Judges were, however, able 
to ignore the results of a search when deciding whether to suppress 
evidence and an inadmissible confession.135 
B.   Damages 
 One area, in particular, in which jury decisionmaking has been 
criticized is the setting of damage awards—particularly the jury’s 
ability to make awards of noneconomic and punitive damages. Con-
sistent with the archival research described above, experimental 
studies comparing the noneconomic damage awards made by judges 
and jury-eligible persons primarily show similarities in the damages 
awarded. Vidmar and Rice asked eighty-nine prospective jurors wait-
ing for jury duty and twenty-one arbitrators to determine none-
conomic damages in a medical malpractice case in which the injuries 
to the female plaintiff resulted in permanent scarring.136 They found 
no differences in the amounts potential jurors and arbitrators 
awarded for pain and suffering.137 Awards by both jurors and arbitra-
tors for disfigurement were significantly correlated with their beliefs 
about the degree to which the scar was disfiguring, affected the qual-
ity of the plaintiff’s life, embarrassed the plaintiff, and was worse 
than a similar scar on a man.138 The awards made by both jurors and 
arbitrators were highly variable, although jurors’ awards were more 
variable than awards made by the arbitrators.139 
 Similarly, Wissler, Hart, and Saks compared how jury-eligible 
citizens, judges, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and defense attorneys make 
                                                                                                                    
 133. Id. at 125. 
 134. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Dif-
ficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in 
Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 
883, 890-91 (1993). 
 137. Id. at 893. 
 138. Id. at 894-95. 
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pain and suffering awards in personal injury cases.140 Some overall 
differences emerged: the awards made by the laypersons were higher 
and more variable than those made by the judges, and laypersons 
rated the injuries as more severe than did judges.141 However, the 
similarities were striking. They found judges and laypersons were 
similarly influenced by the characteristics of the injuries studied.142 
The attributes of the injuries influenced both groups in their assess-
ments of the severity of the injuries and in their dollar awards. The 
dollar awards of both laypersons and judges were somewhat less 
predictable than their ratings of injury severity, though this was 
particularly true for laypersons. In addition, the dollar amounts of 
the two groups were highly correlated, suggesting that they ranked 
the cases similarly, awarding higher amounts in the same cases.143  
 A number of experimental studies have now examined the puni-
tive damage award decisions of jurors and judges.144 In one study, 
Viscusi asked participants at a judicial conference on law and eco-
nomics as well as laypersons to determine whether a court should 
award punitive damages in response to several different versions of a 
hypothetical case.145 Both judges and laypersons were more likely to 
think that punitive damages were appropriate as the damages in-
creased; however, judges were less likely than laypersons to think an 
award of punitive damages was appropriate.146 However, if Viscusi is 
correct that in the scenarios described “the firm should not be found 
negligent, much less be punished with a punitive damages award,”147 
then it is notable that as many as 70% of the judges indicated that 
they thought punitive damages were appropriate.148 In a second 
study using a different scenario, Viscusi found that although all the 
judges awarded some amount of damages while 5% of jurors awarded 
nothing, damage awards by jurors were higher and more variable 
than awards made by judges.149 Hastie and Viscusi asked citizens 
and judges to determine whether the defendant in a hypothetical 
case should be required to pay punitive damages. Citizens appeared 
                                                                                                                    
 140. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison 
of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999). 
 141. Id. at 798-99. 
 142. Id. at 785-87. Participants rated the degree of disability, mental suffering, disfig-
urement, and pain caused by an injury. For both groups disability had greatest impact, fol-
lowed by mental suffering and then disfigurement—pain had no independent significant 
impact. Id. 
 143. Id. at 799. 
 144. For a more detailed review, see Robbennolt, supra note 2, at 146-58.  
 145. W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001); see also Viscusi, supra note 3. 
 146. Viscusi, supra note 145, at 112-14. 
 147. Id. at 111.  
 148. Id. at 114 (in the personal injury/plane crash scenario). 
 149. Id. at 129. The type of damages participants were to award was not specified. 
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to be more likely than judges to believe that punitive damages 
should be paid.150 
 In another experimental study, Robbennolt found that trial court 
judges and laypersons considered similar factors when determining 
punitive damage awards.151 Both jury-eligible laypersons and trial 
court judges made higher punitive damage awards when the injury 
to the plaintiff was more severe, when the defendant’s conduct risked 
more severe harm, and when the defendant was wealthier.152 In ad-
dition, the punitive damage awards of the judges and the laypersons 
were similar in magnitude and were equally variable.153 
 One particular aspect of damage award decisionmaking that has 
received a great deal of attention is the frequently replicated finding 
that jurors are vulnerable to cognitive illusions such as anchoring in 
determining damage awards. Jurors have been shown to anchor on 
the amount of the ad damnum,154 on the amount of a damage cap,155 
or on the amount awarded in a similar case as reported in a newspa-
per story.156 
 More recently, experimental research has demonstrated that 
judges too are vulnerable to cognitive illusions such as anchoring. In 
their study of judicial decisionmaking described above, Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, and Wistrich asked judges to award compensatory dam-
ages in a personal injury suit.157 The suit was in federal court based 
on diversity jurisdiction and was described such that the damages 
clearly exceeded the $75,000 threshold. However, prior to making 
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 155. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Court-
room: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1999); Mi-
chael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
243, 252 (1997). 
 156. W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 313, 331 (2001). For a general discussion of the effects of the media on legal deci-
sionmaking, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, News Media Report-
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BEHAV. 5 (2003).  
 157. Guthrie et al., supra note 124, at 791-92. 
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their damage awards, half of the judges were asked to rule on the de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the $75,000 
threshold had not been met. While nearly all of the participants who 
were asked to rule on the motion denied it, the judges who ruled on 
the motion awarded less in compensatory damages than the judges 
who were not asked to rule on the motion.158 The authors concluded 
that the judges had anchored on the $75,000 threshold in arriving at 
their damage awards.159 Similarly, as noted above, Wistrich, Guthrie, 
and Rachlinksi found that judges’ damage awards were influenced by 
their knowledge of demands made in settlement negotiations.160 
 One other difference between judges and jurors has been found to 
influence damage awards. Trial court judges are likely to observe a 
broader range of cases than the typical juror. This may result in trial 
court judges and laypersons having different perceptions and expec-
tations about the legal system in general and about civil litigation in 
particular. Wissler and her colleagues have observed that in their 
studies of noneconomic damages, damage awards are more corre-
lated with case or injury attributes when participants are asked to 
judge multiple cases or injuries.161 They suggest that judges may 
possess “a more complete cognitive reference scale of injuries to pro-
vide a context for thinking about the case now under considera-
tion.”162 Several studies have found a connection between perceptions 
of the civil litigation system and damage awards. Robbennolt found 
that trial court judges made smaller and more accurate estimates of 
the percentage of jury awards that are greater than $1 million and of 
the percentage of jury awards that include punitive damages than 
did laypersons.163 The magnitude of these estimates was related to 
participants’ compensatory damage awards; however, they were not 
related to participants’ punitive damage awards.164 
C.   Risk Assessment 
 There is evidence that jurors are vulnerable to cognitive illusions 
relevant to assessing risk, such as outcome bias (the tendency to 
judge decision processes and decisionmaking competence more fa-
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vorably when the outcome of the decision turns out to be positive)165 
and hindsight bias (unconsciously overestimating the likelihood one 
would have assigned to an event once the outcome is known).166 
However, there is evidence that judges, too, are vulnerable to cogni-
tive illusions such as the outcome and hindsight biases.167 
 First, there is evidence that judges are susceptible to outcome 
bias. Anderson and his colleagues asked sixty-five state and federal 
judges and fifty-eight auditors to evaluate the correctness of an audit 
decision.168 Those participants who were told that the decision re-
sulted in a negative outcome rated the decision more negatively than 
did those participants who were told that the decision resulted in a 
positive outcome.169 
 Second, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich, in their study of mag-
istrate judges, demonstrated that judges can fall prey to the hind-
sight bias.170 Judges read a scenario that detailed the facts of a pro se 
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ing on whether they are framed as gains or losses. See generally Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984). For evi-
dence that judges are susceptible to framing effects, see Guthrie et al., supra note 124, at 
797. For evidence that lawyers are susceptible to framing effects, see Linda Babcock et al., 
Forming Beliefs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 
15 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 289 (1995). 
 168. John C. Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects 
and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711 (1993). 
 169. Id. at 727. 
 170. Guthrie et al., supra note 124, at 799-805. 
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§ 1983 action in which the district court sanctioned the plaintiff and 
the plaintiff appealed. Judges were told that the appellate court had 
taken one of three actions: remanded so that a lesser sanction could 
be imposed, affirmed the sanction, or vacated the sanction. Judges 
were then given all three possible outcomes and asked to predict 
which of these decisions the court of appeals was most likely to have 
made.171 Judges were more likely to predict the outcome that was 
consistent with the outcome that they were told occurred; that is, 
judges who were given a particular outcome were more likely to pre-
dict that outcome than judges given the other possible outcomes.172 
 Viscusi explored another possible difference in judges’ and jurors’ 
risk beliefs. Consistent with previous psychological research on risk 
perception,173 Viscusi has shown that both judges and laypersons 
tend to overestimate small risks and to underestimate large risks, 
though these effects were smaller in magnitude for judges than they 
were for laypersons.174 It is possible that differences in the ways that 
judges and laypersons conceptualize risk could influence the ways in 
which they assess legal cases. There is still much to be learned about 
whether and how judges and laypersons differ in their conceptions of 
risk and to what extent these conceptions impact their decisionmak-
ing in the courtroom. 
D.   Criminal Cases 
 Several direct comparisons have been made of judges’ and jurors’ 
decisionmaking in criminal cases. Two studies of blame attributions 
have found that judges and laypersons are influenced by similar fac-
tors in criminal cases. Howe asked sixteen Missouri trial court 
judges and sixteen students to evaluate a set of scenarios based on 
two cases in which one person shot another.175 Several versions of 
each case were created to reflect different degrees of intent to injure, 
the justification for the shooting, and the resulting injury. While stu-
dents attributed more blame to the shooter than did judges across 
the cases,176 the blame attributions of both students and judges were 
                                                                                                                    
 171. Id. at 801-02. 
 172. Id. at 802-03. 
 173. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 467 (Daniel Kahneman et 
al. eds., 1982); Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551 (1978). But see HOWARD 
KUNREUTHER ET AL., DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 168 
(1978) (finding that some low risks are ignored). 
 174. Viscusi, supra note 145, at 131-32. 
 175. Edmund S. Howe, Integration of Mitigation, Intention, and Outcome Damage In-
formation, by Students and Circuit Court Judges, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 875 (1991). 
 176. Id. at 886. This was true, in particular, when justification for the shooting was 
higher. “[A]s compared with students, judges assigned markedly less blame for both cases 
when the level of mitigation was high . . . .” Id. 
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similarly influenced by the level of intent, justification, and injury. 
For both groups, greater blame was attributed when the shooter 
acted more intentionally, acted with less justification, or caused a 
more severe injury.177 
 In a second study, Howe and Loftus asked thirteen Missouri cir-
cuit court judges and sixteen students to make blame judgments in a 
case in which a fight led to injury.178 Consistent with the results re-
ported above, while students assigned more blame than did judges 
overall, both groups of respondents assigned more blame when the 
resulting injury was more severe and when the defendant acted more 
intentionally.179 Howe and Loftus also found that judges and stu-
dents displayed “nearly identical pattern[s] of individual differences 
in integration processes.”180 While neither of these studies asked par-
ticipants to render verdicts or to recommend sentences, they do show 
similarities in the factors that both sets of decisionmakers take into 
account in assigning blame in criminal cases. 
 One experimental study has shown differences between judges 
and jurors in the severity of the sentences that they would assign to 
criminal defendants. Diamond and Stalans asked 116 Illinois State 
Court judges who were attending seminars on sentencing, 154 people 
who had reported for jury duty, and fifty-five students to assign sen-
tences to offenders in four cases.181 For each of the four cases, par-
ticipants read a presentencing investigation report, watched a video-
tape of the sentencing hearing, and were provided with the range of 
available sentencing options.182 Although 66% of the lay respondents 
indicated that they thought that Illinois judges were too lenient in 
sentencing,183 lay respondents gave sentences that tended to be more 
lenient than those given by the judges.184 The results suggesting that 
                                                                                                                    
 177. Id. at 883, 885 (students and judges respectively). 
 178. Edmund S. Howe & Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Intention and Outcome In-
formation by Students and Circuit Court Judges: Design Economy and Individual Differ-
ences, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 102 (1992). 
 179. Id. at 108. 
 180. Id. at 111. 
 181. Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency in 
Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 74-75 (1989). 
 182. Id. at 75. 
 183. Id. at 86. 
 184. Lay respondents gave more lenient sentences than judges in two of four cases. Id. 
at 78, 79 (Case 2 and Case 3 respectively). In the other two cases, lay respondents gave 
sentences that did not differ from those given by Cook County judges and were more leni-
ent than those given by non-Cook County judges. Id. at 76-77, 80 (Case 1 and Case 4 re-
spectively). Though not a direct comparison of juror and judges, some related evidence 
comes from a study by Roberts and Doob. Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Me-
dia Influences on Public Views of Sentencing, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 461-62 (1990) 
(finding that laypersons who learned about a criminal case by reading a summary of the 
sentencing hearing were less likely to believe that the judge had been too lenient and more 
likely to believe that the judge had considered all the appropriate factors than respondents 
who learned about the case by reading a media account); see also Loretta J. Stalans & 
500  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:469 
 
laypersons are more lenient in criminal sentencing are consistent 
with the results of Kalven and Zeisel and of Heuer and Penrod re-
ported above.185 
 Diamond and Stalans found “few differences in the way judges 
and laypersons viewed these offenses and offenders” in the cases 
they studied.186 In particular, they found that both groups gave simi-
lar ratings of offense seriousness, and their ratings of seriousness 
ordered the cases in the same way.187 Both groups also made similar 
ratings of the importance of five different goals of sentencing188 and 
made similar predictions of the probability of recidivism.189 
E.   Judges and Juries—The Effects of Group Decisionmaking 
 One of the disadvantages of most of the simulation research done 
in this area is that it compares the decisionmaking of judges with in-
dividual jurors rather than deliberating juries. In 1964, Kalven ar-
gued that: 
Often in the debate over the jury the capacity of one layman is 
compared to the capacity of one judge, as though this were the is-
sue. The distinctive strength and safeguard of the jury system is 
that the jury operates as a group. Whether twelve lay heads are 
better than one judicial head is still open to argument, but it 
should be recognized that twelve lay heads are very probably bet-
ter than one.190 
His point is no less true forty years later. A trial court judge is typi-
cally engaged in making an individual decision, while jurors are al-
lowed to make decisions collectively in groups. 
 This is not to say that the experimental comparisons between 
judges and individual jurors are not informative—they clearly are. 
                                                                                                                    
Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay Evaluations of Criminal Sentenc-
ing, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 211 (1990) (finding that laypersons’ sentences were more 
lenient than required minimum sentence). 
 185. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 25; Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra 
note 35; see also Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock 
Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 
(1988). 
 186. Diamond & Stalans, supra note 181, at 86. 
 187. Id. at 81-82 n.9. 
 188. Id. at 82-85. 
 189. Id. at 82 n.12. There were some differences between the groups, each primarily 
limited to one of the cases. In one case, judges were less likely to believe that the offender 
was addicted to heroin. For a case involving the sale of cocaine, judges’ sentences were 
more strongly predicted by the importance they placed on the general deterrent value of 
sentencing than were laypersons’ sentences. For another case, involving a young offender, 
judges were more likely to believe that a prison sentence would increase the probability of 
recidivism. Id. at 83-85. 
 190. Kalven, supra note 4, at 1067; see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads 
Better than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205. 
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These studies demonstrate many ways in which jurors and judges 
share similar characteristics in their reasoning and decisionmaking 
that are likely to impact their decisions. In addition, it is relatively 
clear that the predeliberation preferences of individual jurors are 
highly predictive of the final jury determinations.191 Nonetheless, in 
this context it is clear that group deliberation has the potential to 
have an impact on decisionmaking that has important implications 
for comparisons between juries and judges. 
 Unfortunately, there is no straightforward conclusion one can 
draw about how group deliberation will affect the comparison in all 
cases. There is evidence that deliberation can result in the attenua-
tion of judgmental biases in some instances,192 improve memory for 
trial evidence, increase complex reasoning about the evidence and 
arguments presented,193 and reduce variability in decisions.194 At the 
same time, there is evidence that group deliberation may exacerbate 
biases under certain conditions195 and can result in more extreme 
                                                                                                                    
 191. See, e.g., Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: 
Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 299 (1998); Mac-
Coun & Kerr, supra note 185, at 21-22; Marla Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot 
Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 175, 175 (1995); David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity 
Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1152-53 (2000); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod, Jury De-
liberations: Discussion Content and Influence Processes in Jury Decision Making, 16 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 323 (1986). See generally Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Ex-
periments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 
37 (1997) (discussing the majority effect). Moreover, as noted above in the text accompany-
ing note 23, it is not always necessary for the experimental setting to mirror the legal con-
text for the findings to be generalizable to the legal setting. It is important to carefully 
consider whether, under what circumstances, and how a departure from the specifics of 
the legal setting is likely to affect the research findings. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical Research in Law and Policy, 81 
NEB. L. REV. 777 (2002). 
 192. Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1443 (1978). See generally Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in 
Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996). 
 193. Monica L. McCoy et al., The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Reasoning 
Skills, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 557, 560-61 (1999) (finding that mock-jurors who engaged 
in group deliberation considered more counterarguments and made more statements 
evaluating the evidence). 
 194. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: 
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 315-16 
(1998) (finding damage awards by mock-juries less variable than those of individual mock-
jurors). 
 195. See generally Kerr et al., supra note 192, at 715. In attempting to tease out condi-
tions under which group deliberation is likely to facilitate or hinder unbiased decisionmak-
ing, it is important to pay careful attention to a variety of characteristics of the task and 
decisionmaking process. Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer predict that where juries operate 
under a “majority wins” type of decisionmaking process and where the evidence is close—
as opposed to an extreme case, either for or against one party—group deliberation is pre-
dicted to exacerbate bias. Id. at 697-702. There is empirical evidence to support these pre-
dictions. See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries: New Evidence 
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judgments, a phenomenon known as group polarization.196 Additional 
research on the effect of jury deliberation generally is clearly war-
ranted as is additional research specifically comparing judges with 
juries making group decisions. 
VI.   JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING AS A BENCHMARK FOR EVALUATING 
JURY DECISIONMAKING 
 The research reviewed here clearly begins to fill a gap in the lit-
erature. While there has been a great deal of research exploring ju-
ror and jury decisionmaking and a separate literature examining in-
fluences on judicial decisionmaking,197 there has been surprisingly 
little research comparing the decisions of juries and trial court 
judges. The most notable conclusion to be drawn from this emerging 
literature is that the decisionmaking of judges and jurors is strik-
ingly similar. While there is evidence of some differences, there is a 
high degree of agreement between the groups, they appear to decide 
real cases quite similarly, and they show a great deal of similarity in 
responding to simulated cases designed to examine a variety of legal 
decisionmaking processes. 
 One problem with comparing the decisionmaking of juries to that 
of judges is that to the extent that there are differences in the deci-
sionmaking of judges and juries, there is not always a clear bench-
mark for determining which group’s decision is normatively better. 
Many of the studies reviewed here—either explicitly or implicitly—
assume that judges are “right.” However, differences in the deci-
sionmaking of judges and juries “do not speak for themselves.”198 For 
example, even if a large number of studies converged on the finding 
that judges are more likely to find for plaintiffs than juries or that 
juries are likely to award higher damages than judges, it would not 
be clear in the abstract which outcome was more “correct.”199 The dif-
                                                                                                                    
from the SDS Perspective, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 70 
(1999). 
 196. See Martin J. Bourgeois et al., Nominal and Interactive Groups: Effects of Prein-
struction and Deliberations on Decisions and Evidence Recall in Complex Trials, 80 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 58, 63 (1995); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blind-
folding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 513 (1992); Diamond et al., supra note 194, at 315-16; Schkade et al., supra 
note 191, at 1153, 1159. All of these researchers found that deliberation results in higher 
damage awards than the predeliberation awards of the jury members. 
 197. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 
(1996).  
 198. Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Deci-
sion Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 727 (1999). 
 199. Id. at 726 (“A weakness of this logic is that the observed discrepancy tells us noth-
ing about whether either decisionmaker (or group) is actually accurate; both could be 
wrong.”). Lempert argues that a problem with comparing judge and jury decisionmaking 
“is the tendency to treat the judge’s opinion as the ‘correct’ one, and to regard contrary jury 
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ferences could reflect “jury incompetence, jury lawlessness or nullifi-
cation, unintended bias, or legally acceptable differences in val-
ues.”200 The degree to which juries ought to make decisions that 
would mirror those of judges is ill-defined:  
We are by no means clear on how much like the judge and how dif-
ferent from him we wish the jury to be. If it is too much like the 
judge, the jury may lose all claim to a distinctive function. If it is 
too little like him we are disturbed by how easily jury equity elides 
into jury anarchy.201 
A.   Interpreting the Differences 
 Each type of decisionmaker has different advantages that they 
bring to their role, and each has characteristics that give them a 
comparative advantage under some circumstances or for some pur-
poses. Jurors, on the one hand, have the benefit of being able to de-
cide in groups and are expected to bring to the process values that 
reflect the conscience of the community.202 As noted above, some dis-
                                                                                                                    
verdicts as deviations from a norm. Yet it is not obvious that the judge’s decision will be 
nearer the ideal than the jury’s.” Lempert, supra note 9, at 103 (footnote omitted). Simi-
larly, Scheiner asserts that:  
[J]ury bias can mean that the jury exercises sound discretion, but that jury de-
terminations nevertheless systematically differ from those that judges would 
make because of moral or experiential differences between judges and juries. 
Because there is no unbiased baseline, any claim of juror bias of this . . . type 
can be restated as an equally true claim of judicial bias. 
Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amend-
ment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 165 (1991). 
 200. MacCoun, supra note 198, at 727; see also Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries 
Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239 (2003) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET 
AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002)).  
[B]ecause juries may legitimately bring to the justice system values that judges 
may not adequately express, and because those different values may some-
times lead juries to decide cases differently than judges would, it would be odd 
to rely too heavily on the judicial norm (or the legal norm as construed by 
judges) to evaluate juries’ decisions. 
Id. at 244. 
 201. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 
OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 178 (1958). 
 202. See Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Judges View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 
247 (1998) (noting that decisions about damages are particularly for the jury). Kalven 
noted that:  
The judge and jury are two remarkably different institutions for reaching the 
same objective—fair impersonal adjudication of controversies. The judge repre-
sents tradition, discipline, professional competence and repeated experience 
with the matter. . . . [The jury is] the layman amateur drawn from a wide pub-
lic, disciplined only by the trial process and by the obligation to reach a group 
verdict . . . . 
Kalven, supra note 201, at 178. In addition, MacCoun argues that judges and laypersons 
are “normatively advantaged in different ways. Judges are clearly more expert in the 
law . . . . But jurors are better suited for reflecting community standards in an ambiguous 
domain like tort litigation.” MacCoun, supra note 198, at 726-27 (citation omitted). 
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agreements between judges and juries are desirable to the extent 
that they “may reflect value judgments that are properly made by 
the jury in close cases.”203 Differences that are the result of improved 
decisionmaking afforded by group processes or that reflect the le-
gitimate value judgments of the jury should be applauded. 
 Other disagreements, however, may not result from the jury’s 
comparative advantages. Instead, some differences may be a result of 
factors for which juries are comparatively disadvantaged in relation 
to judges. In particular, judges might be expected to have a compara-
tive advantage over jurors due to their training and expertise in the 
law and in the fact that, as repeat players in the system, they see a 
large number and a wide variety of cases. Judges are advantaged, it 
is typically argued, in that they have better memory for the trial evi-
dence (often aided by the trial transcripts), have a better under-
standing of the law (due to their training and experience), and are 
better at identifying information presented at trial that is relevant to 
the legal decisions they are expected to make.204 
 Given the other advantages of juries, however, it may not be ap-
propriate to eliminate the jury in these circumstances, but rather to 
focus on ways in which the task of the jury can be structured to 
minimize these disadvantages (that is, to make the jury more like a 
judge in these particular ways) without diminishing the jury’s 
unique contribution and role. For example, structurally, juries’ col-
lective memory for trial evidence may exceed that of individual ju-
rors.205 Moreover, there is evidence that juries’ collective memory for 
trial evidence can be enhanced by allowing them access to the trial 
transcripts,206 to take notes,207 and to ask questions during trial.208 
There is evidence that juries’ understanding of the legal rules could 
                                                                                                                    
 203. Lempert, supra note 9, at 104. 
 204. See, e.g., id. at 91-92 n.59. 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 192-96. 
 206. See, e.g., Martin J. Bourgeois et al., Effects of Technicality and Access to Trial 
Transcripts on Verdicts and Information Processing in a Civil Trial, 19 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 220 (1993); Lynne ForsterLee et al., The Bottom Line: The Effect of 
Written Expert Witness Statements on Juror Verdicts and Information Processing, 24 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 259 (2000). 
 207. See, e.g., Lynne ForsterLee et al., Effects of Notetaking on Verdicts and Evidence 
Processing in a Civil Trial, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 567 (1994); Irwin A. Horowitz & Lynne 
ForsterLee, The Effects of Note-Taking and Trial Transcript Access on Mock Jury Deci-
sions in a Complex Civil Trial, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373 (2001); David L. Rosenhan et 
al., Notetaking Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1994). 
 208. See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials: 
A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
231 (1988); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with 
Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1989) [hereinafter 
Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors]; Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra note 35; 
Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials: A 
National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1994) [hereinafter Heuer & Pen-
rod, Juror Notetaking]. 
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be aided by more clearly and carefully written jury instructions,209 by 
providing written instructions,210 and by providing reasons for the le-
gal rules they are asked to apply.211 Moreover, there is evidence that 
juries’ ability to identify and use relevant evidence could be en-
hanced by giving them instruction on the law before they hear evi-
dence in the case so that they have a template, or schema, with 
which to organize the trial information.212 Additional research is 
needed to explore how these structural changes might moderate any 
differences in the decisionmaking of juries as compared to judges. 
 It is also clear that there are certain types of errors that are made 
by both jurors and judges. Thus, even high rates of agreement are of 
some concern to the extent that such agreement is due to both 
groups making similar errors. For example, both judges and jurors 
have been shown to have difficulty assessing scientific and statistical 
evidence and in ignoring inadmissible evidence. It is possible to deal 
with these shared shortcomings in several different ways—either by 
devising ways to help both groups improve their decisionmaking or 
by structuring trials to minimize such problems. 
 First, at least for some difficulties in decisionmaking, both groups 
might be assisted in ways that can improve their decisionmaking. 
Take the example of the difficulties that both jurors and judges ap-
pear to have with scientific and statistical evidence. Both groups 
might be helped by instruction in these types of reasoning. There is 
evidence that relatively short, targeted training sessions can improve 
                                                                                                                    
 209. There is some evidence that group deliberation improves juror understanding if 
instructions are rewritten according to psycholinguistic principles. See Joel D. Lieberman 
& Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 634 (1997). 
 210. See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors, supra note 208, at 419-21 (finding 
that while jurors who were provided written instructions found them helpful, no difference 
in understanding was detected); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Un-
derstand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Com-
prehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 429-30 (1990) (finding better compre-
hension with some written instructions); Irene Glassman Prager et al., Improving Juror 
Understanding for Intervening Causation Instructions, 3 FORENSIC REP. 187, 191-92 (1989) 
(same). 
 211. See, e.g., Diamond & Casper, supra note 196, at 534; Duane T. Wegener et al., 
Flexible Corrections of Juror Judgments: Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 629, 646 (2000); Roselle L. Wissler et al., The Impact of Jury Instructions 
on the Fusion of Liability and Compensatory Damages, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 134-
35 (2001). 
 212. See, e.g., Lynne ForsterLee & Irwin A. Horowitz, Enhancing Juror Competence in 
a Complex Trial, 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 305, 306 (1997); Lynne ForsterLee et 
al., Juror Competence in Civil Trials: Effects of Preinstruction and Evidence Technicality, 
78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 14, 19 (1993); Heuer & Penrod, Instructing Jurors, supra note 
208, at 425-26; Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof: 
The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1877, 1881 (1979); Vicki L. Smith, The Feasibility and Utility of Pretrial Instruc-
tion in the Substantive Law: A Survey of Judges, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 235, 244 (1990). 
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individuals’ ability to engage in statistical and methodological rea-
soning.213 Open empirical questions remain regarding whether and to 
what extent such training could be effectively incorporated in the 
trial process, the most effective way to structure it, and whether it 
would be equally effective for jurors and judges. Similarly, to address 
concerns about hindsight bias, Hastie and Viscusi suggest that “[i]t 
is even possible that the performance of judges can be improved by 
adding information from professional risk analysis experts at trial, 
perhaps in the form of expert testimony.”214 If such testimony proved 
to be helpful, it is likely that it would be helpful to juries as well. 
 Second, there are ways in which the division of labor within jury 
trials provides a structural mechanism that attempts to minimize 
certain shortcomings in decisionmaking. For example, as described 
above, there is evidence that both jurors and judges have difficulty 
ignoring inadmissible evidence. Jury trials are already structured so 
as to minimize this potential problem. First, there is some evidence 
that group deliberation can moderate the effect of inadmissible evi-
dence on decisionmaking.215 Second, because a judge will typically 
make a ruling in a pretrial hearing about whether particular evi-
dence is admissible, the jury, in most cases, will be shielded from the 
inadmissible evidence. In a bench trial, in contrast, the judge as fact-
finder cannot avoid being exposed to the evidence. 
                                                                                                                    
 213. Geoffrey T. Fong et al., The Effects of Statistical Training on Thinking About Eve-
ryday Problems, 18 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 253 (1986); see also Richard P. Larrick et al., 
Teaching the Use of Cost-Benefit Reasoning in Everyday Life, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 362 (1990); 
Richard P. Larrick et al., Who Uses the Cost-Benefit Rules of Choice? Implications for the 
Normative Status of Microeconomic Theory, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 331, 338-40 (1993); Lehman et al., supra note 103, at 440-41; Darrin R. Leh-
man & Richard E. Nisbett, A Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Undergraduate Training 
on Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 952, 959 (1990); Nisbett et al., Teaching Rea-
soning, supra note 101, at 627-28. It is reasonable to believe that juries may have a com-
parative advantage in this context:  
Judges are lawyers; lawyers are people who, disproportionately more than 
most educated Americans, are uncomfortable with quantitative, scientific, and 
technological information; avoided it as students, and are incompetent with it 
as adults. By contrast, a well assembled jury containing a high school science 
teacher, an accountant, or an engineer, should have greater potential than the 
average judge to understand complex technical or quantitative evidence. 
Saks, supra note 191, at 43. 
 214. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 3, at 917. 
 215. See, e.g., Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Ef-
fects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 306-07 (1983); Kamala 
London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Propensity to Disre-
gard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 937-38 (2000). But see William 
C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 453, 461 (1981) (“[T]here are strong indications that the biasing effects of inad-
missible evidence persisted following deliberations.”).  
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B.   Research Directions 
 In order to be able to devise mechanisms by which decisionmak-
ing can be improved—either by aiding decisionmakers (judges or ju-
ries) or by allocating responsibility for decisionmaking—we must 
have a better understanding of judge and jury decisionmaking that 
goes beyond simple comparisons. Hastie and Rasinski have classified 
four different mechanisms, or “logics,” for measuring “accuracy” in 
judgments that may prove to be helpful in guiding future research in 
this area.216 One of these approaches is to make a direct comparison 
between different decisionmakers.217 The research reviewed here 
comparing the decisions of judges and juries exemplifies this ap-
proach. As Hastie and Rasinski explain, this method “involves com-
paring the judgment of one subject with the judgment of a second 
subject to determine whether the two judges agree. If the two judges 
disagree, then someone must be in error.”218 Despite the problems 
with this approach, research making a direct comparison between 
judges and jurors or juries has been useful in demonstrating that 
there are fewer differences in the decisions made by judges and ju-
ries than might have been imagined. Moreover, these comparisons 
are useful in identifying areas of agreement and disagreement which 
can then be further studied in order to more carefully determine the 
nature of these agreements or disagreements and the processes by 
which they occur. 
 However, Hastie and Rasinski also distinguish three other logics. 
First, they argue that the “most basic” comparison is one between a 
judgment and a demonstrably correct answer.219 Ideally, one could 
compare the decisions of judges and juries with the correct outcome 
to determine which decisionmaker comes closest and under what cir-
cumstances. Feigenson has distinguished a set of criteria which 
could be used to define the correct answers necessitated by this logic: 
a “legal norm” by which the correct answer is determined by “what 
the relevant legal rules appear to require”; an “economic norm” by 
which the correct answer is determined by “the outcome dictated by 
the consequentialist theory of optimal deterrence”; and a “rational 
judgment norm” by which the correct answer is determined by “the 
standards of rational decision-making commonly employed in cogni-
                                                                                                                    
 216. Reid Hastie & Kenneth A. Rasinski, The Concept of Accuracy in Social Judgment, 
in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 193 (Daniel Bar-Tal & Arie W. Kruglanski 
eds., 1988). Robert MacCoun has previously identified the usefulness of this taxonomy for 
thinking about these comparisons. MacCoun, supra note 198, at 725-26. 
 217. Hastie & Rasinski, supra note 216, at 197. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 196. 
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tive and social psychological research.”220 However, as MacCoun 
notes, cases that come to trial are frequently those cases that lack 
such clear answers.221 To limit the judge-jury comparison to cases in 
which the answer is clear misses far too much. 
 Two other logics identified by Hastie and Rasinski involve exam-
ining the information that decisionmakers use in reaching a decision. 
Decisionmakers may err because they “use a bad cue” such that their 
decision was influenced by a factor that should not have influenced 
the decision222 or they may “miss a good cue” such that their decision 
was not influenced by a factor which should have provided an influ-
ence.223 For example, decisionmakers use good cues when they base 
their punitive damage awards on the nature of the harm and the 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. In contrast, decision-
makers miss a good cue when they do not appropriately use base-
rate information, and they use bad cues when they base decisions on 
flawed empirical research or inadmissible evidence. Following these 
logics, one could compare judges and juries in their abilities to reach 
decisions using appropriate cues. 
 Research that combines a direct comparison of decisionmakers 
(that is, judges and juries) with another of these logics or norms (for 
example, using bad cues or missing good cues) would prove useful in 
determining not just whether the decisions of judges and jurors dif-
fer, but how the two groups compare against some other benchmark. 
For example, the Landsman and Rakos study of inadmissible evi-
dence is a useful model of this approach. It directly compared judges 
and laypersons in their use of inadmissible evidence—a bad cue—as 
defined by the legal rules of evidence—a legal norm.224 Similarly, 
Robbennolt directly compared judges and laypersons in their use of 
both good and bad cues for determining compensatory and punitive 
damages, as defined by case law—legal norms.225 
 In addition, future research might also carefully explore and com-
pare the norms, attitudes, and understandings that jurors and 
judges bring with them into the courtroom. Such factors can influ-
ence how judges and jurors decide cases, particularly in close 
                                                                                                                    
 220. Feigenson, supra note 200, at 242. Feigenson also described a “judicial norm” 
(that is, “what a judge would have decided”) which corresponds to the “logic” of direct com-
parison between juries and judges. Id. 
 221. See MacCoun, supra note 198, at 726 (“This logic has been quite fruitful in psy-
chophysics, but perhaps less so in social psychology, where we often lack objective meas-
ures of the ‘true’ state of the sociopolitical environment.”). 
 222. Hastie & Rasinski, supra note 216, at 198; see also Kerr et al., supra note 192, at 
689 (describing “sins of commission”). 
 223. Hastie & Rasinski, supra note 216, at 198-99; see also Kerr et al., supra note 192, 
at 689 (describing “sins of omission”). 
 224. Landsman & Rakos, supra note 130, at 120-22. 
 225. Robbennolt, supra note 2, at 146-58. 
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cases,226 and may play an important role in those cases in which ju-
ries and judges would reach different results. Existing research, for 
example, has explored juror attitudes toward tort plaintiffs, plain-
tiffs’ lawyers, corporate defendants, and physicians.227 In addition, 
psychologists have explored the notions that laypersons hold about 
justice and fairness.228 Political science research has explored the in-
fluences of a variety of individual difference factors, including politi-
cal affiliation, on judicial decisionmaking.229 Very little research has 
explored the similarities and differences of jurors and judges on 
these types of normative, attitudinal, and conceptual factors. 
Whether these predispositions are “good cues,” “bad cues,” or simply 
legitimate value differences, a more nuanced understanding of these 
notions would help to inform this debate. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Research has begun to explore the similarities and differences in 
the decisionmaking of juries and judges—although direct compari-
sons are still relatively uncommon. Research that has been done to 
date demonstrates some differences, but shows striking similarities 
in the decisionmaking of judges and jurors. While there appear to be 
some differences in outcomes under some circumstances, judges and 
jurors generally appear to be influenced by similar factors and suffer 
from many of the same difficulties in making their decisions. More 
research is needed to define the contours of these differences and 
similarities and to inform mechanisms by which the decisionmaking 
process can be improved. In particular, future research ought to 
combine a focus on making direct comparisons between judges and 
juries with evaluation against external benchmarks.  
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